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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final orders, judgments and 
decrees of the Third District Court under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
ISSUE #1: The trial court erred in holding that Mr. Yates owed an 
independent duty to the Reighards as a builder/contractor, particularly in light of 
the undisputed fact that Mr. Yates, who built the subject home, had resided in the 
home for nearly 2lA years before selling the used home to the Reighards. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a duty exists is 
a question of law and involves the examination of the legal relationships between 
the parties. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Association v. 
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P.3d 234. Questions of law 
are reviewed by the appellate court de novo and are not granted any deference. 
Appellate review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized 
by the term "correctness." "Correctness" means the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised in a 
l 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 7, 2008 (R.312), again in the 
Motion in Limine re: Construction filed on September 28, 2009 (R.1326), argued 
during the course of the trial in connection with the jury instructions (R.l 702 at 
p. 177), in Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict (R.1349) and in Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for 
Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed October 14, 2009 (R.1481). 
ISSUE #2: The trial court erred in upholding the jury's award 
against Mr. Yates, based upon negligence, in light of the fact that Davencourt, 
decided on the day of the jury's deliberations and verdict, held there is no duty to 
conform to building codes and no independent duty to act without negligence in 
the construction of a home. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a duty exists is 
a question of law and involves the examination of the legal relationships between 
the parties. Davencourt, supra. Questions of law are reviewed by the appellate 
court de novo and are not granted any deference. Appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term "correctness." 
"Correctness" means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not 
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993); Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: ; ^sue was raised In Mi 
Yates in his Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the 
Alternative, for Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed on or about November 9, 
2009. (R. 1480.) 
ISSUE #3: The trial court erred in ruling that the economic loss 
doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs claims, because there was no admissible evidence of 
the type and amount of mold in the home, and there was no evidence of medical 
causation between the exposure \ /vian Reighard's ant '• mi b 
Reighard's physical symptoms. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The applicability of the economic loss 
doctrine is a question of law. Davencourt, supra. The question of whether a duty 
exists is a question of law and involves the examination of the legal relationships 
betwec the ' 'jvencourt, supra. Questions of law are reviewed by the 
appellate court de novo and are not granted any deference. Appellate review of a 
trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 
"correctness." "Correctness" means the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was ra -d - vlr. 
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Yates in his Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Dismissing Negligence Claim (l5t Cause of Action), filed on or about 
May 5, 2008. (R.583-84.) This issue was also raised in the Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Mr. Yates' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the 
Alternative, for Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed on or about November 9, 
2009.(R.1578.) 
ISSUE #4: The trial court abused its discretion in allowing Eugene 
Cole, a Ph.D. in Public Health, and a non-physician, to testify as an expert witness 
about the relationship between exposures to mold and alleged health effects 
resulting from that exposure or to diagnose conditions allegedly suffered by Aidan 
Reighard and Alan Reighard. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The qualification of an expert witness 
lies in the discretion of the court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984). 
However, a three-step analysis is required for admission of scientific evidence: 
1) are the scientific principles and techniques supporting the expert's testimony 
inherently reliable; 2) have the scientific principles and techniques upon which the 
expert relies been properly applied to the facts of the case; and 3) is the evidence 
more probative than prejudicial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by Mr. 
Yates in his Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Eugene Cole and Charles 
4 
Dixon (Plaintiffs' Mold Witnesses), filed on or about August 4, 2009. (R.981). 
This issue was also raised at trial when Dr. Cole was called by the Reighards to 
testify as a witness. (R. 1700 at pp. 13-14). 
ISSUE #5: The trial court erred in awarding the Reighards' costs as 
part of the Final Judgment in this matter, because Mr. Yates had properly served an 
Offer of Judgment upon the Reighards in an amount that was more than the 
"adjusted award." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Interpretation of a rule of procedure 
presents a purely legal question that is accorded no deference and the trial court's 
decision is reviewed for correctness. Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App. 25, | 4 , 
204 I'...Hi ISO. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issued was raised by 
Mr. Yates in his Memorar. • • ; • • • > 1 * 1 . * ' '•. v • [' 
Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs, filed on or about October 2b, 2009. \K. 1 :> iz). 
ISSUE #6: The trial court erred in ruling that Mr. Yates was not the 
prevailing party in this matter and in denying him his attorney fees, under the Real 
Estate I'mi hasc ( Onlract. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Which party is the prevailing party is an 
appropriate question in the sound discretion of the trial roml. dependm;." . >n tin 
context of each case. Review is an abuse of discretion standard. Appropriate 
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considerations for the trial court would include, but are not limited to, (1) 
contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., 
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and 
their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the 
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims. 
R.T. Nielson Co, v. Cook 2002 UT 11, |25, 40 P.3d 1119. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by Mr. 
Yates in his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs, filed on or about October 26, 2009. (R.1512). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah R. Civ. P. 68. Settlement Offers 
(a) Unless otherwise specified, an offer made under this rule is an offer to 
resolve all claims in the action between the parties to the date of the offer, 
including costs, interest and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, 
attorney fees. 
(b) If the adjusted award is not more favorable than the offer, the offeror is 
not liable for costs, prejudgment interest or attorney fees incurred by the offeree 
after the offer, and the offeree shall pay the offeror's costs incurred after the offer. 
The court may suspend the application of this rule to prevent manifest injustice. 
(c) An offer made under this rule shall: (1) be in writing; (2) expressly refer 
6 
to this rule; (3) be made more than 10 days before trial; (4) remain open for at least 
10 days; and (5) be served on the offeree under Rule 5. 
Acceptance of the offer shall be in writing and served on the offeror under 
Rule 5. Upon acceptance, either party may file the offer and acceptance with a 
proposed judgment under K i ile 58 A 
(d) "Acl ji isted aw ard" it i leans tl le an 101 n it aw ai ded b;; ' tl ic fit iclei of fact ai id, 
unless excluded by the offer, the offeree's costs and interest incurred before the 
offer, and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract and not excluded by the 
offer, the offeree's reasonable attorney fees incurred before the offer. If the 
offeree's attorney fees are subject to a contingency fee agreement, the court shall 
determine a reasonable attorney fee • he period preceding the offer. 
II(iiIII1 Ill: Evidence 702 ** • 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto ii I tl :te for i t :i • i > f a i i opu lioi i oi :)tl iei \ vise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, oi other specializes >wledge may serv e j is 1 .1 n : 
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles 
or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they 
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(i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have 
been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the 
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the 
facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert 
community. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case stems from a dispute relating to a home located at 2478 
Daybreaker Drive in Park City, Utah. Mr. Yates constructed the home in 2001, 
intending to use it as his personal residence, and he resided in the home from 
November 2001 until approximately March 2004. The Reighards purchased the 
used home in February 2004 and had lived in the home for nearly 2 lA years when, 
in August 2006, Ms. Reighard discovered a small patch of mold in the basement of 
the home. Ms. Reighard suspected the mold had been causing alleged health 
problems for her infant son, Aidan Reighard, and for Mr. Reighard. Ms. ELeighard 
immediately called a mold remediation company and shortly thereafter had all of 
the stucco from nearly the entire home removed and replaced. 
The Reighards claimed Mr. Yates was responsible for the damage because 
8 
he was the contractor for the home, an< vvsi • >al was held in 
October 2009 and, after the trial court considered post-trial motions, a final 
judgment was entered in June 2010 against Mr. Yates in favor of the Reighards in 
the amount of $10,419.25—a $7,500.00 reduced jury award arising from 
negligence and $2,919.25 in costs. Because the trial court incorrectly decided 
several issues in this matter, this appeal followed. 
B . Cmil si ill' Pi m i rilin ' i ,1111! I)is|iiisiliiin lt< Inw 
Alan and Suzy Reighard, husband and wife, and Aidan Reighard, the 
Reighard's infant son, filed a Complaint1 against Mr. Steven Yates on February 1, 
2007 seeking damages related to seven (7) causes of action: (1) Negligence, (2) 
Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Express Warranty, (4) Negligent 
Misrepresentation, (5) Fraudulent Misrepresentation (f^ Fraudulent Concealment 
and (7) Fraudulent Non-Disclosure. (R.001). =' >•'••< •= *'i:rd-Party 
Complaint against E. Marshall Plastering, the stucco contractor on the home, in 
November 2007. (R.097). E. Marshall Plastering later settled with the Reighards 
by making a payment to them for $5,000.00 and was dismissed from the case on 
September 30, 2008 >^r,\ 
1
 Although Suzy Reighard's brother, Daniel S. Drage, filed the initial Complaint, 
Ms. Reighard's sister, Christine E. Drage, who is a California attorney, appeared 
Pro Hac Vice throughout the rest of the matter, with Ms. Drage's California 
associate, Trevor Resurreccion filing most of the pleadings. 
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In April 2008, Mr. Yates, through counsel, filed three (3) Motions for 
Partial Summary Judgment: (1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing 
Negligence Claim (1st Cause of Action) (R.309); (2) Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment to Dismiss Contract (2nd and 3rd) Causes of Action (R.316); and (3) 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Fraud (5th, 6th, and 7th) Causes 
of Action (R.326).2 
In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating to the 
Reighards' negligence claim, Mr. Yates argued that the claims were barred by the 
economic loss doctrine because Mr. Yates had not acted as the Reighards' 
contractor and therefore owed them no duties outside of the REPC; further, the 
Reighards could not prove bodily injury, further barring their negligence claims 
under the economic loss doctrine. (R.312-14). The trial court denied the Motion 
stating that Mr. Yates "owed Plaintiffs a duty of care as the builder/contractor/ 
seller of the home." (R.778). The trial court also denied Mr. Yates' other two (2) 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment citing unresolved issues of fact. (R.779-
81). 
During discovery, Alan Reighard's physician, Dr. Brian Drage 
(another brother of Ms. Reighard and who had also treated Aidan), was deposed. 
During his deposition, Dr. Drage admitted he could not testify with any reasonable 
2
 An Errata to this Motion also included the 4th Cause of Action. (R.340). 
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medical certainty that f\ li R eigl i< ird's or Aidai i""s he<: 1.1.1:1 i problems were caused by 
the mold in the home. (R.218, 219). 
A four-day trial was held in this matter from September 29 - October 
2, 2009. (R.l 143). Dr. Drage was called as a witness and, again, testified that 
there was no evidence of medical causation between Aidan Reighard's health 
symptoms and exposure to llie mold am! lhal lit1 |a,\; /Man1!1; unending physician) 
had never provided medical livatmnil to Alan that 1 ic believed was causually 
connected to the mold in the home. (R.l700 at p. 65). The Reighards called Dr. 
Eugene Cole, a professor at BYU, who testified there were "potential associations 
and relationships between the adverse environmental conditions and their adverse 
health symptoms," but because he was not a medical doctor, he could not testify as 
to medical cai isatiot i (R 1' \ •- r.es presented < : ^:* - v : ; >r. 
Hung Cheung, a medical cic ii.u., who agreed win u\. i^ragc b opinion 
that there was insufficient evidence of causation. (R.1701 at p. 145). Additionally, 
there was no admissible testimony presented at trial as to the type or amount of 
mold either on the surfaces or in the air of the home. {See Footnote 6, infra, at p. 
24.) 
• . Based upon I >rleml;ini \ Motion lor a Diieelrd Venliel pin i In the 
case being submitted to the jury, all but three claims against Mr. Yates were 
dismissed; only the claims for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and breach 
n 
of contract were submitted to the jury. (R. 1444-49). The jury found in favor of the 
Reighards only on the negligence claim and awarded the Reighards $10,000.00 in 
property damage, $0.00 in medical expenses, $0.00 for loss of use and enjoyment 
of residence, $0.00 for other economic loss, and $2,500.00 in non-economic 
damages, including pain and suffering, for a total award of $12,500.00. (R.1445). 
The jury found in favor of Mr. Yates on the negligent misrepresentation cause of 
action and determined that the Reighards, themselves, had breached the REPC. 
(R.1446, 1448). 
After the trial, Mr. Yates filed a Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict arguing, again, that the Reighards' negligence claim 
was barred by the absence of duty and the economic loss doctrine. (R. 1480-83). 
The Davencourt opinion, which was issued by this Court the same day the jury 
entered its special verdict in this matter, further supported Mr. Yates' arguments. 
(R. 1480-83). However, the trial court again held that the economic loss doctrine 
did not bar the Reighards5 negligence claim, and denied the Motion. (R. 1625-27). 
The trial court did, however, grant Mr. Yates' post-trial Motion to 
reduce the jury's verdict by the $5,000.00 the Reighards received from E. Marshall 
Plastering; the final judgment for damages was reduced to $7,500.00. (R. 1627). 
Mr. Yates had served an Offer of Judgment, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 68, on the 
Reighards in September 2007 in the amount of $10,000.00. (Attached as Exhibit 
12 
"A" to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs (R.1512)). Yet despite this Offer of Judgment, 
the trial court still awarded costs to the Reighards. (R.1632,1668-71). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Mr. Steven Yates constructed the home located at 2478 Day breaker Drive, 
Park City, Summit Comil\ 111'X lOON in '1)01 inleiidnr In use il ;is his personal 
residence. (R.320). 
2. A certificate of occupancy was obtained on the property on November 9, 
2001 and Mr. Yates resided in the home from approximately that date until 
approximately March 2004. (R.320). 
3. Mr. Yates listed the home for sale in early 2004 and the Reighards made an 
offer t> : chase tli home almost immediately niereafter -^ ; <). 
••'.'. i. ' '• ie, Ms. Reighan JJI bueily williMr. iuu• it 
the home; Mr. Reighard never met with Mr. Yates until years after the home was 
purchased. (R.320). 
5. Ms. Reighard's only conversation with Mr. Yates prior to purchase of the 
home was to It'll him il was a beautiful house; no represent, itions were i ,ak ••" 
standard written property disclosures provided as part of the sale of the property. 
(R.320). 
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6. Likewise, neither Mr. Reighard nor Ms. Reighard had any conversations 
with Mr. Yates' real estate agent, Ms. Barb Sandford, prior to the purchase of the 
home. 321. The only discussions that Mr. and Ms. Reighard had had with respect 
to their real estate agent were irrelevant to the status of the construction and/or 
cannot be recalled. (R.321). 
7. Mr. Yates and the Reighards entered into a standard Real Estate Purchase 
Contract ("REPC") in February 2004 for the purchase of the home at a final 
purchase price of $680,000.00. This REPC was the only contract entered into by 
the parties. (R.321, R.001 "Exhibit "A"). A copy of the REPC is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit " 1 . " 
8. At the time of the purchase, the Reighards were aware that Mr. Yates had 
constructed the home. However, they understood that they were buying, and 
intended to buy, a used and previously occupied home and the parties used the 
standard Real Estate Purchase Contract. (R.310-311). (Addendum Exhibit 1.) 
9. Prior to closing the sale, the Reighards had an independent real estate 
inspection conducted by a company called Amerispec; Amerispec provided a 
report on February 4, 2004 and the report indicated there were no notable defects 
with the home. (R.248). 
10. An appraisal was also conducted on the home prior to the purchase; the 
appraisal indicated that the home was, at that time, effectively three (3) years old. 
14 
(R.248). 
11. The Reighards moved into the home in approximately March 2004 and 
continued to reside in the home at least through the commencement of this action 
in 2007. (R.248, 001). 
12. During the first summer of their occupancy (2004), the Reighards had 
various sprinkler repairs performed. wever, neither Mr. Reighard nor Ms. 
Reighard can identify the nature of all the repairs nor identify the contractor who 
made the repairs. (R.248, 360-61). 
13. In the summer of 2005, the Reighards had a deck installed on a corner of 
the home; in connection with that deck, excavation was performed on the 
northwest corner of the home. (R.361). Neither Mr. Reighard nor Ms. Reighard 
knows the details of the excavation r sprinkl '• lications made in connection 
with the deck's install; •> '-.,•• "^» •••••, :
 : ;• ., >r 
"scraped [] off the top layer of soil on the corner of the house where the mold was 
[later] discovered." (R.248-49). 
14. In August 2006, nearly 2 Y2 years after living in the home and over 4 V2 
years after the home was constructed, Ms. Reighard discovered a patch of mold 
underneath a windowsill in a basement family room. (R.249). 
15. Ms. Reighard suspected the mold had been causing alleged health problem 
for her infant son, Aidan, and for Mr. Reighard. (R.476, 481). 
15 
16. Also within a day or two, the Reighards obtained the services of a 
contractor who exposed the sheetrock in the basement location in an attempt to 
remediate the mold. (R.249). 
17. After the sheetrock had been removed, and the additional mold had been 
exposed, various companies came to perform testing for the levels of airborne 
mold in the home. (R.249). 
18. There is no evidence available as to the levels of airborne mold in the home 
prior to the removal of the sheetrock and exposure of additional mold which 
occurred in August of 2006. (R.249). No evidence was presented at trial as to the 
types or levels of mold in the home, at anytime. {See the Record generally.) 
19. Subsequent to the discovery of the mold, the Reighards retained a 
contractor, RAM Builders, to perform exterior repairs on the home. Although the 
Reighards blame Mr. Yates for the problems with their home, Mr. Yates was not 
advised of the contract with RAM Builders and was not provided any opportunity 
to inspect the home prior to or during the course of the construction. (R.249). 
RAM Builders' contract for the remediation work contained a five year warranty; 
RAM Builders5 witness, Shaan Sanderson, conceded that a claim against RAM's 
stucco installation, if made five years following installation, would be denied. 
(R.1700@p.l01). 
20. Subsequent to repairs being made by RAM Builders, and in February 2007, 
16 
the Reighards lilrd a complaint against Mi s containing seven (7) causes of 
action: (1) Negligence, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Express Warranty, (4) 
Negligent Misrepresentation, (5) Fraudulent Misrepresentation, (6) Fraudulent 
Concealment, and (7) Fraudulent Non-Disclosure. (R.001). 
ARGUMENT 
I.BEC USI \\\U.\ \ I IS IMIMNni <>\H \ m IINDI'I'I •'IV DENT 
DUTIES TO THE REIGHARDS, THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Reighards have contended throughout this matter, and the trial court 
agreed, that because Mr. Yates built the home in question, he automatically owed 
an independent duty to the Reighards as a builder-contractor. The existence of 
such .i < ' '• Jer-evenonb 
specifical i nome lor « mother - was expressly rejected by this Court in 
Davencourt. 2009 UT 65, |47. "Therefore we conclude that the district court 
properly rejected the independent duty to act without negligence in the 
construction of a home." It would be an absurd result if Mr. Yates, who built the 
house for himsc < u here for several years thereafter before selling it 
pursuant to a standard form REPC, were to owe a greater duty to his purchasers 
than an expressly retained builder would have. 
The Reighards and the court below based their basis for a finding of an 
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independent duty on the Court of Appeals decisions of Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT 
App. 101,134, 158 P.3d 562 and Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT47, 
%14-15. The sections of Yazd and Moore upon which the Plaintiffs and Court 
relied, however, respected a builder's duties of disclosure and not of negligent 
construction. The result of the Moore opinion was a remand as to "whether the 
[defects] were material, whether the Smiths had knowledge of the defects, and 
whether they failed to disclose those defects to the Moores." Id at ^36. In this 
case, the court allowed the jury to evaluate the evidence and decide the negligent 
misrepresentation cause of action, and the jury found that the Defendant had used 
reasonable care in determining the truth of all representations that he made. 
(R.1446). 
Furthermore, even in Moore, the court stated: "whether a duty exists is 
strictly a question of law; it grows out of the relationship between the parties, and 
the duties created by that relationship." 
A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be 
accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which parties 
are in privity of contract. Age, knowledge, influence, 
3
 The trial court's pre-Davencourt analysis of this issue interpreted Yazd as 
providing that Yates, as a builder "owed a duty to Plaintiffs beyond anything they 
contractually agreed to." (R.778). This statement, of course, runs counter to the 
fundamental basis for the adoption of the economic loss rule, which is to allow the 
liability of builders to be defined by contract. "The law of torts imposes no 
standards on the parties' performance of the contract; the only standards are those 
agreed upon by the parties." American Towers Owners Ass % Inc. v. CCI Meek, 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1996). 
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bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive ability are but 
the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances 
that a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is 
owed by one party to another. Where a disparity in one or 
more of these circumstances distorts the balance between the 
parties in a relationship to the degree that one party is exposed 
to unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by creating a duty 
on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does 
not reward exploitation of its advantage. 
Id. (citu Li ),/_ • Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 16, 143 P.3d 
283). 
In the instant matter, Mr. Yates did not act as the Reighards' builder or 
contractor; Mr. Yates had not even met the Reighards at the time he was 
constructing the home nor was he intending to build the home for anyone other 
than himself. Mr. Yates built the home as his own personal residence and resided 
in the home for nearly 2 lA years before selling the home to the Reighards. At the 
time of the purchase, the Reighards obtained their own home inspection and knew 
that they were purchasing a used home, and they knowingly chose to purchase a 
used home.4 
The only relationship Mr. Yates had with the Reighards was that as a seller 
4
 The parties' standard REPC was limited in its provisions respecting the condition 
of the property conveyed, particularly as to the aspects of construction complained 
of by the Reighards. As to the roof and foundation, the REPC warranted only that 
"the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller." The Reighards 
produced no evidence that Mr. Yates knew of any leaks at the time of sale or prior, 
and the Reighards themselves were unaware of any alleged leaks until several 
years after they purchased and moved into the home. See Complaint (R.001), 
generally and specifically Exh.D thereof, reflecting photos taken in August 2006. 
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of a used home. The only contract between the parties was the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. Unlike the builder in Moore who only lived in the home for 
three (3) weeks, Mr. Yates lived in the home for nearly 2 Vi years, which fact 
greatly differentiates this case from Moore and Yazd. In fact, the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Moore expressly suggested that Yazd may not be applicable to 
situations such as Mr. Yates', stating "Yazd did not address the question of whether 
builder-contractors have a duty to remote purchasers, and we do not address that 
question here.. .The three-week occupancy of the home by the Smiths and contract 
to sell to the Moores before completion of construction, however, are insufficient 
to remove this case from the reach of Yazd" Moore, 2007 UT App. 101, Fn. 11. 
The Reighards also attempted to support their negligence claims based upon 
allegations of building code violations; to the extent they did so, the evidence was 
irrelevant. In Davencourt, this Court specifically stated "No common-law duty 
exists that creates a duty to conform to building codes." 2009 UT 65, f44. 
II. UNDERDAVENCOURT AND THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE, 
THE JURY'S AWARD FOR NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET 
ASIDE 
Based upon the trial court's ruling that Mr. Yates had an independent duty to 
the Reighards as a builder-contractor, the Reighards' negligence claims were 
allowed to proceed to the jury. Based thereon, the Reighards presented their case to 
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the jury based upon their evidence that Mr. Yates failed to conform to the building 
code in several respects and was ultimately responsible therefore, and also that he, 
as the builder, was negligent in constructing the home. Even assuming such a duty 
existed, however, the Plaintiffs were precluded from recovering economic damages 
under a negligence theory, in the absence of "physical property damage [i.e, 
damage to other property,] or bodily injury." SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 
Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs, Inc., 2001 UT 54, f32, 28 P.2d 669. 
While the jury was deliberating on October 2, 2009, this Court issued its 
Davencourt opinion, and re-addressed the economic loss doctrine in connection 
with claims against builders. The Court first held that "we do not believe that 
building codes create an independent legal duty for purposes of avoiding the 
economic loss rule." 2009 UT 65 at f 43. This Court's opinion analyzed the 
history and determined that "[n]o common-law duty exists that creates a duty to 
conform to building codes." Id. at [^44; this Court held that the District Court had 
properly dismissed the Association's claim for negligence per se, based upon the 
absence of an independent duty. Id. 
This Court next held that the economic loss rule continues to preclude any 
independent duty for a contractor to build without negligence. This Court stated, 
"we conclude that the District Court properly rejected the independent duty to act 
without negligence in the construction of a home." Id at f 47. As this Court stated 
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in American Towers, "contract principles resolve issues when the product does not 
meet the user's expectations, while tort principles resolve issues when the product 
is unsafe to person or property." 930 P.2d 1182 @1190. 
In this case, even assuming the existence of some negligence other than in 
connection with the construction or building code violations, the economic loss 
rule would also preclude recovery, due to the absence of any physical property 
damage or bodily injury. In light of the absence of any admissible evidence of 
bodily injury, and further by the jury's express finding that there were no medical 
expenses caused by the negligence5, the trial court erred in not setting aside the 
jury's verdict. 
This Court continued "Finally, we emphasize that this implied warranty does 
not abrogate the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of existing or used 
residences." Id. at *{ 62. As the Reighards both acknowledge that they knew at the 
time of the purchase that it was a used home, the doctrine of caveat emptor 
excludes their claims. 
III. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE OF BODILY INJURY 
As is set forth above, the economic loss doctrine holds that "economic 
damages are not recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage or 
5
 As to the medical expenses associated with the negligence, the jury found $0. 
(R.1445). 
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bodily injury." SME Industries v. Thompson, 2001 UT 54, f32, 28 P.3d 669 (citing 
American Towers Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. CCI Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 
(Utah 1996)). Economic loss is defined as: 
Damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the 
defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim of 
personal injury or damage to other property...as well as 'the 
diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality 
and does not work for the general purposes for which it was 
manufactured and sold.' 
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 
1182, 1189 (Utah 1996) (quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 
875 P.2d 570, 579-580 (Utah App. 1994)). Thus, economic damages are not 
recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage to property other than 
that negligently constructed, or bodily injury. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1189. 
There was no evidence of damage to other property presented at trial, 
but the Reighards alleged that both Mr. Reighard and the Reighards' infant son, 
Aidan Reighard, suffered bodily injury due to the mold in the home and attempted 
to present evidence of this during trial. After hearing the evidence, the jury 
awarded $10,000.00 for property damage to the residence, $0.00 in medical 
expenses, $0.00 for loss of use and enjoyment of residence, $0.00 for other 
economic loss, and $2,500.00 in non-economic damages, including pain and 
suffering, for a total award of $12,500.00. (R.1445). 
In addition, the jury was correct in its denial of medical expenses 
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because neither of the only two (2) medical doctors that testified at trial, Dr. Brian 
Drage (who was Mr. Reighard's brother-in-law and Aidan's uncle) and Dr. Hung 
Cheung, testified with any reasonable medical certainty that the alleged health 
effects suffered by Mr. Reighard and Aidan were causally connected to the mold 
found in the home. (R.1700 at p. 65) ("Q: [to Dr. Drage] Have you ever provided 
any medical treatment for Alan Reighard that you believe may be causally 
connected to the mold in his home? A: No. ... Q: You do not believe that it can be 
established [] with reasonable medical certainty that there was a causal connection 
between Aiden's symptoms and the mold; correct? A: I saw Aiden once so my 
ability to make that connection, I told you, I cannot."); (R.1701 at p. 145) (Dr. 
Cheung concurs with Dr. Drage's inability to find causation.) And Dr. Eugene 
Cole, a non-physician, conceded on cross-examination that he could not - and was 
not - making any conclusion as to the mold conditions and the Reighards' 
symptoms. (R.1700 at p. 46). 
Still further, there was no admissible evidence presented by the 
Reighards of the amount of or type of airborne mold that was in the home. 
6
 Mr. Yates is cognizant of his duty to "marshal the evidence" which would support 
a finding respecting the amount or type of mold in the home. (Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9).). There was no such evidence presented however. None of the witnesses 
who conceivably could have testified on this subject ended up testifying, and the 
only evidence of mold arose from pictures, which could not identify the types of 
mold, or the amount of airborne mold at any given time. Additionally, Mr. Yates 
raised a timely challenge to the lack of evidence in this regard in its Motion in 
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IV. DR. EUGENE COLE, A PH.D., SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS REGARDING 
HEALTH EFFECTS RESULTING FROM EXPOSURE TO MOLD 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 702, which governs testimony by experts, was amended 
in 2007 to clarify the jurisprudence on the issue and codify the test used to 
determine whether a witness may testify as an expert. The rule now states: 
(d) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(e) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the 
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles 
or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they 
(i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have 
been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(f) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the 
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the 
facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert 
community. 
The Defendant initially sought to exclude Dr. Cole's testimony via a Motion 
to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Eugene Cole and Charles Dixon, filed on 
August 4, 2009 (R.981). Counsel for Mr. Yates continued this objection through 
Limine to Exclude Testimony of Sattar N. Tabriz, P.E., R.L.S.; Zia Yasrobi, P.E.; 
Kurt Salomon; and Charles Dixon, M.P.S.H., C.I.H., which was filed on March 24, 
2008 (R. 224-40). Mr. Dixon, the only witness who had taken these airborne mold 
samples, did not testify at trial. 
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attempted voir dire of Dr. Cole at trial; that voir dire was terminated almost 
immediately by the trial court judge, who indicated he would allow Dr. Cole to 
testify. (R.14). Counsel for Mr. Yates objected to the ruling and anticipated 
n 
testimony at that time. Id. 
In light of Rule 702, Dr. Eugene Cole did not qualify as expert witnesses, 
and should not have been allowed to testify in this case. Further, because "the 
qualification of a person as an expert witness is in the discretion of the trial court," 
this trial court should have excluded the testimony of this alleged expert and the 
court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony. Green v. Louder^ 2001 UT 
62424, 29 P.3d 638. 
Dr. Cole holds a Ph.D. in Public Health. However, he testified at trial on the 
Reighards' medical conditions and treatment in relation to the alleged mold growth 
in their home. There was no indication from Dr. Cole's expert report that his public 
health education, research, or experience qualified him to opine on the individual 
diagnoses of Alan and Aidan Reighard or, more generally, the health effects of 
human contact with mold in a residential setting. In fact, on cross-examination, he 
7
 Assuming that the Court agrees that the negligence claims should have been 
dismissed based upon the absence of duty or the economic loss doctrine, in light of 
the absence of competent medical evidence, the admission of Dr. Cole's testimony 
is obviously harmless. To the extent, however, that the evidence could arguably 
support an exception to the economic loss rule, it should not have been allowed. If 
Dr. Cole's testimony is excluded, there would be absolutely no basis for disregard 
of the economic loss rule, and the Reighards' claim for economic damages would 
fail. 
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admitted his inability to opine on medical causation. (R.1700 at p.46). Rather, he 
could only "look[] at potential associations and relationships..." Id. He 
acknowledged that "Causation is something that's usually difficult and not possible 
to [] determine." Id at 49. He could testify only to "associations" between mold 
and physical symptoms, and since he had no knowledge as to the type and 
quantities of mold, he could testify only generally. Id at 51. 
As a Doctor of Public Health, Dr. Cole is potentially qualified to testify from 
a public health standpoint, not from a medical standpoint. Dr. Cole cannot make 
medical diagnoses and does not have the qualifications to question or evaluate the 
diagnoses of the Reighards by physicians. Dr. Cole's training and experience was 
irrelevant and inapplicable to the only relevant issue - whether or not Alan and 
Aidan's alleged symptoms were caused by the mold - and thus his testimony 
should have been excluded. 
"A reliability standard is necessary because while often helpful, scientific 
testimony also has the potential to overawe and confuse, and even to be misused 
for that purpose. Consequently, jurisprudential history reveals a consistent attempt 
to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence." Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT 
App 436,118, 131 P.3d 252. The basis for Dr. Cole's testimony was misplaced, 
making his testimony both unreliable and inadmissible. Dr. Cole never had or took 
the opportunity to examine or investigate the alleged contamination of the 
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Reighards' home firsthand. The Reighards had the mold removed before any 
expert was able to inspect it. Consequently, Dr. Cole's testimony was based solely 
on photographs of the mold growth, depositions of the Reighards and other 
witnesses, and selected portions of the Reighards' medical records. Dr. Cole had 
not even visited the Reighards' home when he wrote his expert report. 
The references that Dr. Cole cited to support his testimony are not relevant 
or reliable in relation to the issues in this case. Most of this literature discusses 
medical problems that neither Alan nor Aidan Reighard experienced, for example, 
asthma, decreased immune function and depression. Other articles Dr. Cole relies 
on discuss occupational exposure to microorganisms in the agricultural industry, a 
topic that is unrelated to the issues in this case. Consequently, the information did 
not aid the trier of fact in determining the causal relationship between Alan and 
Aidan's alleged symptoms and the alleged mold growth and, instead, likely 
prejudiced Mr. Yates by making the presence of mold in a residence appear 
necessarily dangerous when, in fact, there was nothing to support that conclusion 
in this case. 
Furthermore, Dr. Cole recognized in his deposition that many of the articles 
he was citing were not included in the Damp Indoor Spaces and Health report by 
the Institute of Medicine because the Institute did not believe that there was 
8
 Of course even had he been able to visit the house, Dr. Cole never would have 
seen any of the mold, as it had been removed and remediated several years prior. 
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sufficient evidence to support the findings in these articles. (R.989). This 
demonstrated that these principles are not "generally accepted by the relevant 
expert community" as required by Utah R. Evid. 702(c). Consequently, the 
reliability standard under Rule 702(b) for the methods and principles underlying 
Dr. Cole's testimony will have to be proven by other means. 
Neither Dr. Cole nor anyone else ever identified the type of mold or fungus 
that was growing in the Reighards' home. There was no evidence as to the amount 
of airborne mold at any time during the Reighard's occupancy of the home. A 
complete investigation to determine the type of mold or fungus was never 
performed. Consequently, the basis for Dr. Cole's testimony regarding the alleged 
contamination in the Reighard's home was based solely on speculation as what the 
contamination actually might have been. This testimony is of little use to the trier 
of fact. As the court in Haupt states, "the trial court must consider whether the 
proffered testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact. 'Evidence not shown to be 
reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible.'" Haupt, 
2005 UT App. 436, f24 (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397-98 (Utah 
9
 The only test for airborne mold (taken by Charles Dixon who did not testify at 
trial), was taken in the master bathroom, and was taken after the sheetrock therein 
had been removed by the Plaintiffs and/or their contractor and while the Reighards 
were not living in the home. (R.990) And neither Ms. Reighard nor anyone else 
could exclude the possibility that this airborne mold originated from the bathroom 
carpet or some other source unrelated to a construction defect. 
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1989)). 
In a recent California Court of Appeals decision on a case very similar to 
this one the court stated, 
[A]n expert's opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary 
support... or on speculative or conjectural factors . . . has no evidentiary 
value . . . and may be excluded from evidence.. . . Therefore, an expert's 
opinion that something could be true if certain assumed facts are true, 
without any foundation for concluding those assumed facts exist in the case 
before the jury, does not provide assistance to the jury because the jury is 
charged with determining what occurred in the case before it, not 
hypothetical possibilities. 
Jennings v. Palomar Health Systems, Inc., 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117 (Cal. App. 
4th Dist. 2003). 
As stated above, Dr. Cole was unable to identify the type of mold or fungus 
that was growing in the Reighards' home based solely on the photographs he was 
given and a complete investigation to determine the type of mold or fungus was 
never performed. Dr. Cole's testimony painted an inaccurately grave picture of the 
severity of the mold growth in the Reighards' home based only on speculation, as 
the appropriate testing and investigation of the mold was never completed. 
Consequently, the basis for Dr. Cole's testimony regarding the type and severity of 
alleged contamination in the Reighards' home is based only on conjecture. 
Throughout his testimony, Dr. Cole stated that both temporality and a dose 
response relationship between Alan and Aidan's alleged symptoms and the alleged 
mold growth in their home have been established. However, there is no evidence 
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supporting this statement. It is unknown how long the mold was present in the 
Reighards' home before it was discovered or how much mold was present in the 
home at significant times. It is possible that the mold was present when the 
Reighards moved into the home in 2004, one year before Mr. Reighard and Aidan 
began experiencing any alleged symptoms and two years before the mold was 
discovered. Dr. Cole's assertion that there is both temporality and a dose response 
relationship between the alleged mold growth and the plaintiffs' symptoms is thus 
based completely on speculation as to when the mold growth started and how 
much was present at relevant times. 
Finally, Dr. Cole attributed moisture intrusion to poor construction or 
shoddy repair. This was a conclusory statement without any foundation that was no 
doubt prejudicial to the Defendant, who built the house, and ignores the fact that 
the Plaintiffs acknowledged that they themselves had sprinkler repairs and system 
modifications conducted after the purchase of the home and before the discovery 
of the mold. Various unidentified sprinkler repair people, who may or may not 
have been licensed, made sprinkler repairs of which the Plaintiffs can provide no 
details; grading changes were made to the exterior of the property; sprinkling 
schedules and frequencies may have been altered. Thus, it is impossible to 
determine to what extent the conduct of these contractors may have contributed to 
the alleged moisture conditions which brought about the mold. This statement by 
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Dr. Cole implies that Mr. Yates is to blame for the water intrusion and is based on 
mere speculation and accordingly, should be excluded. 
V. THE REIGHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
COSTS AS PART OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT 
On September 17, 2007, Mr. Yates, through counsel, served an Offer of 
Judgment, in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 68(c),10 on the Reighards in the 
amount of $10,000.00. A copy of the Offer of Judgment, originally attached as 
Exhibit "A" to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs (R.1512), is included in the Addendum 
as Exhibit "2." 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the Reighards a judgment 
against Mr. Yates in the amount of $12,500.00. (R.1445). This amount was 
subsequently adjusted to $7,5000.00 by the trial court to reflect the $5,000.00 
settlement between the Reighards and E. Marshall Plastering. (R.1627). 
Following the reduction of the verdict, the trial court granted costs in the 
amount of $2,919.25 to the Reighards broken down as follows: $505.00 Filing/Pro 
Hac Vice Fees, $75.00 Jury Fee, $2,265.25 Deposition Transcripts, $74.00 Witness 
Fees. (R.1670). However, because the adjusted award of $7,500.00 was not more 
favorable that the $10,000.00 Offer of Judgment which had been made by Mr. 
10
 The text of Rule 68 is set forth in the Determinative Authority, supra, p. 6. 
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Yates to the Reighards in 2007, Mr. Yates should not have been responsible to pay 
the Reighards any costs incurred after the Offer of Judgment. See Utah. R. Civ. 
68(b). As such, the trial court erred in awarding these costs to the Reighards; 
rather, Mr. Yates should have been awarded his costs under this Rule. 
VI. MR. YATES WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE REPC 
The Reighards' Complaint included nine causes of action. (R.001). At the 
close of the Reighards' case in chief, the Court dismissed three of the causes of 
action, and consolidated two more, leaving the jury to be instructed on the claims 
respecting breach of contract/breach of warranty, negligence, and negligent 
misrepresentation. (R. 1444-1449). The jury's verdict clearly established that Mr. 
Yates ultimately prevailed on all causes of action other than the negligence claim; 
the jury specifically found that the Reighards themselves had breached the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract by failing to abide by the REPC's mediation obligation. 
(R.1448). 
In spite of the fact that Mr. Yates clearly prevailed on the breach of contract 
claim and on seven of the eight remaining claims, the trial court ruled that Mr. 
Yates was not the prevailing party and declined to award Mr. Yates his attorney 
" Once again, if this Court reverses the jury verdict respecting negligence, this 
particular issue becomes moot. In that event, however, the Rule 68 Offer of 
Judgment would provide an additional basis for an award of Mr. Yate's costs 
incurred after the offer. 
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fees and costs under Section 17 (Attorney Fees and Costs) of the REPC. Section 
17 states "In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees." See 
Addendum, Exhibit " 1 . " 
A court that is determining who prevailed is to follow the "flexible and 
reasoned approach" as clarified mA.K&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47, f25. In connection with this determination the Court is to consider, 
among other things: 
(1) Contractual language, 
(2) The number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought 
by the parties, 
(3) The importance of the claims relative to each other and their 
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and 
(4) The dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with 
the various claims. 
Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, [^26, 172 P.3d 668. 
In this case, Mr. Yates clearly and unequivocally prevailed on the claims 
arising from the REPC, which provided the only basis for attorney fees. That in 
and of itself should establish the Mr. Yates' status as the prevailing party under the 
provision which entitles an award of attorney fees; Mr. Yates having prevailed on 
almost all of the other causes of action merely affirms that Mr. Yates should have 
been awarded the vast majority, if not all, of the attorney fees which Mr. Yates 
incurred in defending against the Reighards' claims. 
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Still further, and based upon the arguments above, the Reighards should not 
have prevailed on the negligence cause of action. Mr. Yates had no independent 
duty to the Reighards as a builder-contractor, Mr. Yates had no duty to act without 
negligence in the building of the home, and based upon the jury's finding of no 
physical injury, the Reighards claims were further barred by the economic loss 
doctrine. 
Additionally, the Reighards specifically attempted, prior to resting, to 
reserve their desire and intent to explore Mr. Yates' net worth in the event that they 
prevailed on their fraud-based claims. They intended to seek punitive damages 
above and beyond the compensatory damages that they were seeking; Mr. Yates' 
success must take into account the success in defending against these fraud claims 
and the associated risk of punitive damages. Furthermore, even after these fraud 
claims were taken away, the Reighards argued in their closing argument for a 
judgment at or in excess of $100,000.00; Mr. Yates successfully limited the jury's 
award to $12, 500.00. Based upon all these factors, Mr. Yates should have been 
considered the prevailing party in this matter and should have been awarded his 
costs and attorney fees under the REPC. If this Court reverses the negligence 
award, there can be no dispute that Mr. Yates will have prevailed in all respects, 
and he should be awarded all of his fees, which were significantly less than the 
fees sought by the Reighards. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
By this appeal, Mr. Yates asks this Supreme Court to rule that Mr. Yates had 
no independent duty to the Reighards as a builder/contractor because Mr. Yates 
was acting in the capacity of a seller of a used home when he contracted with the 
Reighards. The trial court's ruling that Mr. Yates owed an independent duty to the 
Reighards (and the trial court's denial of Mr. Yates' various motions in that regard) 
should be reversed. 
In addition, the trial court's denial of Mr. Yates' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict should be reversed based upon the Davencourt 
opinion. Mr. Yates did not have a duty to act without negligence in the building of 
the home and there is no independent duty to conform to building codes. Further, 
because the jury found no physical injury and there was no admissible evidence of 
physical injury to Mr. Reighard and Aidan, the economic loss doctrine bars the 
Reighards' claims for negligence. The only plausible evidence respecting physical 
injury came through Dr. Cole; he should not have been allowed to testify as to the 
effects of mold on Mr. Reighard's and Aidan's health, and if his testimony had 
been properly excluded the economic loss rule would apply. 
Finally, because Mr. Yates was the prevailing party, and should be the sole 
prevailing party in this matter following the reversal of the negligence award, Mr. 
Yates should be awarded his costs and attorney fees under the REPC and the trial 
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court's denial of these fees should be reversed. The trial court's award of costs to 
the Reighards should also be reversed under Utah R. Civ. P. 68, and Mr. Yates' 
costs should be awarded. 
Mr. Yates also seeks his costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this 1^ day of December, 2010 
LINCOLN^W. HOBBS 
JULIELADLE 
KATHY A.F.DAVIS 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
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Daniel S. Drage 
BOYLE & DRAGE, P.C. 
2506 Madison Ave 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Christine E. Drage 
Trevor O Resurreccion 
WEIL & DRAGE, APC 
23212 Mill Creek Drive 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
and an original and nine copies were filed with the clerk of the appellate court. 
DATED this J^L day of December, 2010 
LIMt^LN W. HOBBS 
JPLIE LADLE 
KATHY A.F. DAVIS 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Real Estate Purchase Contract (R.0001, Exhibit "A"). 
2. Offer of Judgment (R. 1512, Exhibit "A"). 
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
TOiftftaJf^frUyttftdtrigcofrfret. UUhlwr*ijurrt*r«#lest*t*licef>*»t* to us* this tarn. B^rahd3«*k*. however, <Ti*y*sr^  to *tt»r or 
<toki* to pt&^tom <*)**& 9 dtlk*^ torn*. tfywid*sJtel^0ft>x*dvlc*,«*k!mK 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer Al*a & gu<y *»i<fo**<> offers to purchase the Property 
«4» r^fh«rt Kfelnw Artrt hereby d&)h/*re trt thi* RmkAf^ »« PamiHrt MnrW the amount of S XO, ^ 00 «00 in ^)e form of 
Pergonal chuck which, upon Acceptance of this offer &y all parties (as defined m Section 23), 
shall be deposited fen accordance with state taw. 
Received by: .
 m on (Date) 
(Senator* of tgenttbrotor acknowledges rec**** of Earnest Money) 
Brokerage: prvKianti^i tr*»h R M ! ggtat» . Phone Number 435-g43-isqo 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY: 3478 Paybr»ak«r Pr „ •••• — 
also described as; _ TAX XP g JB*-3-513e 
City of Ear* citYL County of groantx State of Utah, Zxp 64036 (the "Property"). 
1.1 Included Items* Unless excluded herein, this sate include* mo following Heme ft presently owned and attached to 
the Property: ptombing, heating, air condRJontng natures and equipment; ceafng fans; water heater, buiK-io appliances; light 
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom rtxtures; curtains* draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows: 
window bBnds; awnings; installed television antenna; sateime d&hes and system; p*rm*riMtiy affbted carpats; automatic 
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter^); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also oe 
included in this sale and conveyed under separate B8I of Sale with warranties as to title: ?!»»*« »*» Item T»O an 
Mifcftched addeactoyOp* for d e t a i l * T mmmm , 
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this safe: a/a 
1.3 Water Rights. The following wain* riohts are Included in this safe: * * * ;to*Mft«*«*fc ey u*w " 
PURCHASE PRIOR The Purchase PHoe for the Prop^ & $ 630,ooo,oo 
2,1 Method of Payment* The Pwchase Pnoe wiJJ be paid as foflows; 
iorooo.oo (a) Eame«t Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract* THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
530. ooo.oo (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new Joan as prowled in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply 
feroneormoreofthefbiioivlfiglAmH: |»CONVENTIONAL H F H A I I V A 
i I OTHER (Spedfy) . 
If an FHAA/A k>an applies, see attached FHAA/A Loan Addendum* 
If the loan is to incHxfa any particular terms, then chfiex below and give details: 
f J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS . 
$-., 
$. 
$ 
$ 
S~-
120,000.00 
650,000.00 
(c> Loan Assumption Addendum (Sea attached Assumption Addendum If applicable) 
(d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
{e) Other (specify)
 uit „ _ ^ 
(f) Balance or Purchase Price in Cash at Settternent ~ ~~~ 
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through ft) 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
ta) [>0 Buyers obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for th& applicable 
*oan(s> rererenceo In Section 2. H*>) or (c) rihe "Loan*). This condition t» referred to a* the Ttoneing Condition * 
(b) I I Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. 
Section 2.3 does not apply,
 A 
Pag* 1 Of 6 pa$** Sellers Initials Date ^ | ^ r > initial* ^ Dat* 
T&t* ioxm ia **tfcori*ad for u«m by Al Bmrbo#&, & »eaiw»r o* tfcf *%r* c<Uy «a«xd o* Sumito**. J! e * r 
0 3 / 2 5 / 2 0 0 0 0 3 : 4 5 FAX 435 649 4773 $
 A W S SAMVKV 
32/06/2884 63:05 14356491581 AL BARBOSA PRUDD^M 
5L3 Application for Loan* 
(«) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application A Fee 0**d!in* refemnrari in Section 24(a). Buyer $baH 
appty for the Loan. "Loan Application* occurs only when Buyer has: 0) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender ah* 
"Lender*) the initial loan application md documentation required by the Lender and 0i) paid all loan appftcaltion fees a* 
required by the Lender. Buyer agreas io diligently worn to attain tb* Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with ?ny 
additional documentation as required by the Lender. 
(b) Procedure if toon Application ts denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that U\e Lend** 
docs not approve fb* Loan <a "Notice of Loan Denial*). Buyer shell no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a 
copy to Sefier. Buy.*r or Seller may, within three calender days alter Seller's receipt cf such notice, cancel this Contract In* 
providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.p(b): (i) If the Notice of Lot*. 
Denial wa$ received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d). the Earnest Moatv 
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; © If the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer after that date, the fiercest 
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Sellers exclusive remedy the Earnest Money 
Deposit a? liquidated datmoes. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the fmmur# 
Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section ottrus Contract snart u? 
governed by such oiher provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property Pi 13 I J IS NOT conditioned upon the Proper? / 
appraising for not less than tne Purctose Price. This condition Is r&ferreo to as trie "Appraisal Condition*. If trio Appier i 
Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for less than the 
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Vafeia"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such wntten notice 
to Seller no later than three days after Buyers receipt of suon wrtoen norlcc. In the event of a cancellation under th* 
Section 2.4; (r) if th* Notfce of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later thAn the Appraisal Deadline referenced «n 
Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (i) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received i*t 
Buyer after that dale, the fcamesi Money Deposit shall t** teteeaed to Seller, and Setter egroco to accept as seto't. 
exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A fellum to cancel as provided in this Section 2A 
shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other sectc-.' 
of tftis contract snaH be governed by such other provisions. 
X SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. 
Settlement shall tafce place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on a date upon which Buyer cv: 
Seller agree in writing, "Setttemertf shall occur only when all of the following nave been completed: <a) Buyer and Sa'tei 
have signed and d r^ivorod to •»ch other or to the esa*vw/rJos*no office all documents required by this Contract, by »t*v 
Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under ihast. 
documents {except for the proceeds of any new loan) h^vn been dtfrvemd by Buyer io Seller or to lbs escrow/closfog orce-
in the form of mRfe-tad or cleared funds: and (c) any monies required to be paid by Setter under these documents hay;-. 
been defivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office In the form of collected or cle&red funds, setter ^nd Buy' * 
shall each pay one-half (#) of me fee charged by the escrew/cfosfno office for ft$ services in the $ettiement/cfc>$— \ 
process. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be proratec' u 
Settlement as set forth In this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limrted tor security deposits* clean Irty depose 
and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at settlement. Prorations set forth in this Section sbatf be 
me4e as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(0, unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parses. 
Such writing could <ntfude the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered do^ed when Settlement has fc&c«> 
completed, and wtwn all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered ty 
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office; and (B) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded »r . -c-
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (!) and fli) ortho preceding aentcne© shall be completed WHU?-. 
four calendar days of Settlement, 
4. POSSE33ION. Seltet shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: bd _ 34 hours { | days after Closing. 
( J Other (specify). 
> N S E E I 
ialsf IB 
5, CONFIRMATION < 2 p » E N C Y DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
I } Seller** Init als *[ 1 Buyers Initials 
The Listing Agent, Ba*rbAr» gangord represent E*3 Seller I 3 Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
— as a Unfitted A gent; 
The Listing Broker, Prudential Utah RB~SV represents £ J Seller [ ] Buyer £K$ both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent: 
Page 2 of 6 pages Sorter's Initials Date ^ j ^ ^ y * * * * fc>H*als ^_ &•*<>_ 
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The Selling A0eot> Al Bayboaa , represents I I Seller p<J Buyar I J both Buyer and Seltar 
s& a Limited Agenv 
The Selling Broker, Prudent ia l vtah ftg-sv represents f I S«l!«r [ J Buyer M both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent 
e. TITLE INSURANCE, At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance 
insuring Buyer In me amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense 
7* SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced In Section 240), Seller snail provide 
ro Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures"; 
M a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller: 
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
(c) a copy of ai>y leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building w 
zoning code violations; and 
(ft) Other(specffy)cc^>yi, fttttSflt go* *K*mfg R fry*^, M,»* *ftffi> 
8, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's oblation to purchase 
under thle Contract {cb*ck applicable box**): 
(a) [Xj IS { ] 1$ NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Section 7: 
(b) tx l 13 I | IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of* physical condition Inspection o n t o propeily, 
(c) I J IS M *S NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor {'Survey"}; 
(d) txj IS f J is NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms and availably of homeowner's insurance 
coverage for the Property; 
(e) {XJJS ( ]*$ NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property; (specify) 
B»rif»n
 i Tya-tr . 
if any of the above terns ere checked In the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, e.2r a.3 and 6,4 apply; otherwise, they do not 
apply. The items checked In the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the -Evaluations & Inspections/ Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be pafej for by Buyer Bnd shall be oondiid** by 
individuals or entittes of Buyers choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the wa* 
through inspection uftder Section 11 -
8,1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in $ectfc& 
24(c) Buyer snail: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections: &nd (b> determine if the Evaluations & inspections a?? 
acceptable io Buyer. 
&JL Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable. Buyer may, 
no internum UIB Evaluations & inspections Deadline, eitner: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written nofece to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections. 
$.3 Failure to Responds If by the expiration of the Evaluations $ Inspections Deadline. Buyer does not: (a) cancel 
this Contract as pro\ided in Section a .2; or (b) deliver u written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & inspections 
the Evaluations & inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer 
5.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shzl) have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period-) In whtoh lo agree In wribny upon tt*e manner ot 
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10J2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyers 
objections. If Buyer and Seller nave not agreed in writing upon trie manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer me? 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no !$ter than three oalemtor doyo after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer uncct 
this Section a,4. Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warrantee in 
Section 10. 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS- There p<J ARE { 1 ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there are 
the terms of the following addenda are Incorporated into this Contract by th'ts reference: [X J Addendum wo.one 
[ J Seller Financing Addendum [ J FHAAfA Loan Addendum [ 1 Assumption Addendum f J Lead-eased PzUr< 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure w required by law) I 1 Lead-Based Paint 
Addendum On soma transactions this addendum is rewired by law) £ 1 Other (SDBCHV) „ _ _ 
Paga Z of e page* S© Iter** Initials Pate " " ^ W ^ e r ' s Initiate Date 
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10. SfcLLER WARRANTIES fc REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title, Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property 2nd wiH convey good ai\C 
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by genera! warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property 
subject to the following matters ot record: aasernents, de^H resrHcrlona, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions anr* 
restrictions), and ri<}hts*of-way; and subject to me contents of the Commitrnertt for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buye* 
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing teases affecting the Property and not expiring 
prior to Closing. Buyer agroos to be responsible for t»*esk assessments* homeowners association duas, utilities, and other 
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any toan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1 (c). 
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, Judgments, mechanics liens, tax tens and warrant.* 
Seller v/Bi cause to be paid current by Ck>sinQ all Assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the fblowing condition ON THE DAi t 
SELLEft DEUVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-reiated 
damage to the Prof >erty shall be repaired at Sellers expense; 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing a,rni sprinkler systems and fixtures, *nd the appliances and fireplaces wt»» 
be in working order and fit tor their intended purposes; 
<c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller: 
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits* and shaU be in working order zu<\ 
fit for \is Intended purpose: and 
te) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be m the £UHI* general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance, 
10v3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from fr* 
warranties provider by Seller under Sections 10,t and 10,2 above. (Check applicable box«e); A one .year Horn* 
Warranty Plan { J WILL fXJ WILL NOT be included m this transaction. If Included, the Home Warranty Plan shalt 'c < 
ordered by t J Buyer I } Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by | ] Buyer [ ] setter, The cost of the Hor.* 
Warranty Pktfi shall not exceed S and shell be paid for at Settlement by £ ] Buyer { J Setter. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION* Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon, reasonable notice and at a reasonable time. 
conduct a •Valk-thioogh* inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is *es represented,* meaning tnet 
the ilems referenced in Sections 1.11 8,4 and 10.2 ("the items'^  are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed. ano 
\n the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace* correct or repair th* 
items or> wftft th« consent of Buyer (and Lender if ann^^bfe), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the seme. 
The failure to conduct a walkthrough Inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a wa*v*r 
by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented, 
12. CHANGES PURlNG TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Ckwng, none </* 
the following shall occur without the prior wntten consent of Buyer: (a) no changes \n any existing leases shall &e made; (r; 
no new leases shall be entered Into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be matfe c. 
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS, If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, tnist, estate, limited liability company, »? 
other entity, the person executing mis contract on rts behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and tu bind Buyer antf 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with m addenda* any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosure* 
constitutes the entire Contract between (he parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations. 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except Dy 
written agreement of die parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties Bgree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(check applicable box) 
IX! SHALL 
t 1 MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation. If tho parlies agree to mediation, the dispute shaH be submitted to mediation through 1 
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs or mediation, if medrauon 
Tails, the other procedures and remedies available ur\6&r this Contract shall apply. Nothing In this Section 15 shall pwhlbW 
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pftnrttng mediation. 
1$. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain tto Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or v.. 
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return ft and sua Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue 6ilm remedies available at few* If Seller defaults, in 
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller 3 sum equal to tht Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may su$ SeBer to specifically enforce this contract or pureue other remedies 
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand. It b agreed that 6Mi^\ of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a defeult and Is governed by Section 
2.3(b). 
17, ATTORNEY FEES AMO c o s t s , in the event of WioaUon or bindmg arbitration to enforce this ContoCL tho prevailing 
party shatl he emitted to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees snail not oe awaro*$u (or participation 
in mediation under Section 15. 
IB. NOTICES* Except as pfovki0<i In Section 23, all notices required und^r this contract mim be: (a) in willing; (b) s*$ncd 
by the party giving notice; and {c> recerved by the other party or the other party's agent no later ihat\ the applicable date 
referenced In thte Contract 
19. ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made In this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. AH risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or n« 
Improvements due to any cause exespt ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking m eminent domain, shall oe 
borne by Seller until the transaction t$ closed. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE, Time Is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be 
agreed lo in wnung &y a» pantos, u*>h*as otherwise expltoijy stated )n this Contract (a> performance under each Sectmi; 
of this Contract which refemnces a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b) 
the term "days* shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the 
timing requirement (Le.> Acceptance, Notfoe of toan Denial, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shaJ not 
be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed m 
m writing by such non-party. 
22. FAX THANSMJSSION AND COUNTERPARTS- Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original, Th*s 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE "Acceptance* occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other, (a) 
SIQOS th& offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as fequirw). 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Suyer and Seller agree that the fbffowjng deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline February 9tb 3004 (Date) 
\b) Seller Disclosure Deadline February 16*h 3004 (Date) 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline March XSth 2004 (Date) 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline March 3i«t 2004 (Date) 
(a) Appraisal Deadline ,u yarcb 3Iat 3004 (Dsst&y 
(f) Settlement Deadline April 29th 3004 (Date) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on me shove terms and conditions ft 
Seller does not accept this offer by: $*oo [ ] AM CXJ PM Mountain Time on February strh 2004 (Date;. 
th\& offer shall iap$&; end tho Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer, 
ycf*s Sio/ioture) (Offer Date) •^Mmf /« Sipnature) (Offer Date) 
w 
5 Of 6 pagen 3*her*a Initial* , Pate ^ i^Kfrr^ initial* Oat* . 
tovm i s author!**d for us* by M &arfeo»A, a *«ab*r ot tm ?*T* City »oard z£ Realtor*. ^2Si*?rK?* ar> 
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(Btyert 
Th# later of tha abov« Offer Dates sha* be warned io as the ''Offer R«fere»c» 0*tc" 
ns'Names) (PLEA5E PRINT) (Notice Address) (ZioCode) (Phone) 
ACC£PTAr*CeCCHJNTCROFFEWREJECTlON 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ) ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Adepts the fbreQOing offer on the terms and conditions specified 
abov*. 
I J COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyers offer subject to the exceptions o? 
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO, ^ 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Sellers Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
C J RfcJECTtoWt ^tterRe^c*sthefbreoomaoflfer. 
(Meier's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Setter's Signature) (Dfcte) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State lew requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Setter w3th copies of this Contract bearing ell signatures. (Fit) in applicable 
section below) 
A* I acknowledge ieeeipt of a final copy of the tbreoomg Contract bearing ell signatures: 
(Buyer's signature) pate) (Buyers S&oature) (Date) 
(Seller's Signature) "" (One) (Sellers signature) ~ pate) 
8. I personally caused a final copy of trie foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be J 3 faxed J 1 malted ( ) har^ c 
delivered on „ (Date), postage pmpa\& to the I J Sejler I J Buyer. 
Sent/Delivered by (specify) « - ~ - - « _ _ ^ w - - ^ _ ^ _ _ _ ^ . 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAt ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFP1CE OF THf: UTAH ATTORNEY G£*Jf RAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST *, 30OX IT REPtACES AND SUPERSEDES Alt PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSION* OF THIS FORM, 
Page 6 or 6 pages Seller* initiate Date ^Bi^er'e tnjtml* Date. r%  
Tiiia form i a «utJfto<*ix^i for UB« by x i 8*jrbas», * » w b e r of tfe# F*rX c i t y Board of *«o3.tora» J8SS8T£,r 
82/0S/2884 83:85 14358491501 AL BARBOSA PRJJDEHTIA PAGE i& 
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FEH4-20M WED 10:38 AH U.is^BWHICftTiOB hftX NO. . J N U B tutu r. u» 
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ds/fia/siie* 2a: 1a 1435s4*1901 «*L WKSOS* PRU&EKTIA P A « e7 
T&^Wiw&Laimm" •J pjaKASsasj—(zyasir* —raw 
CHtGKOKB 
wove* 
I T ) * 41 ' * *=w»r%« • M m * 
I ) REJECTION: 6OtarR»jHMmt«X90ol»s offer. 
A. I jcfewmfccfc* ftctfetof a tetf<*<# o f * * tawir* Cp*nw t»«fttt *» tigMft**; 
B<flrt/DttUM«*»dfoftp«aM
 r J . , — .„ . , * ^ » 
¥%it i*y* i f » * ^ r U M i«r UH >r &l * £ > * * * • * - * * • * • * «** #•** * U r * " * * ** * * * * * * * * * *ftiffBf&* 
»*»« * «wr« # * * « » ft+ft+i** **« 
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ADDENDUM NO. o>x* 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS 1$ AN [X] ADDENDUM { J COUNtHROFFER to thai REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (ths "REPC) wftf^  
an Offer Reference Date of y*isniA?>r 5trh 2004 . Including all prior M<im4a pod counteroffer*, betwe&f> 
Alan 4 Suxy Rtilghayd as Buyer, and flfceven T YAtes , as Seller 
ragaitJJr>0 the Property located at 3478 Payfcreaker Pr Park c i t y 9T 8409a The 
fotkxvtn£ t*rme arc* herefcy Incorporated oe part of the REPC: 
1, Seller to provide & install missing hardware on doors in bagemeut-
2. AJS par Item 1.1 of tho SBPC the following items apply: 
* All fc*jr Stoole in, fcJxo KitcHa*x 
* All attached light f ixtuxes 
* Big Screen TV in the Media Room 
* All BXeocronic Equipment & components in the Madia Room 
+ Snow-blowex in the gnmgo. 
BUYER AND SEUER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): tX] REMAIN UNCHANGED I J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: „ 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with my provisions of the? REPC% including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shaft comroL AB other terms of the REPC, including *» prior addenda and counteroffers 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same, DO Seller I 1 B u f y e l ^ ^ h a y « u r ' t i l., *r9P I J AM D<J PM 
Mountain Time on Tmhrn*xry 6 t h 2pp4 (Dale), lo accept the terms of this ADDENDUM In accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offen»s set forth in this ADDENDUM shall fef^e. Provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the orceins t 
' ^ p B u y e f I JsallerSignature (Date) (time) ^ ^ M Buyer{ ] seller Signature (Date) (Time) 
ACC^PTA NCeCOUNTEROFFER/REJECTlON 
CHECK ONE. 
t J ACCEPTANCE! i } Seller £ 1 Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
[ } COUNTEROFFER: [ J Seller { J Buyer presents as a coonteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. 
(Signature) ' "~ (Date) (Time) (Signature) ™ ~ — — " p " ^ ) ' (Time) 
{ ] REJECTION: £ l $ * t k r f J Buyer n&jecte the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Ttfn*) 
THIS FORM APPRO* CD BY THE UTAH WEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND T H * OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTO W E Y GEWEftAL. 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST * , 2003, fX REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES AtL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Tkta for* i * Au^hotlxed for aee by AX Saorfco**, * B^ab** *£ *&* Park City B©*ra of R e a l t o r s 
'FEB^OS-gJ04 THlJ'02123 Pft"LOVE-COHMUNfCATIUNH "VfiX'NU. a u l b T a a w i "* r. u 
fvb Qti Of 12:4->p Sef*^t Staff s s a ^ l i a
 f . 8 
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P x » of 
ADDENDUM NO. * * 
TO 
REAt ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Tim \S AN |*JADDSNOOM | J C0Ut*T&iOf H?* to ttu* KEAL ESTATE PURCHASg CQNTKAOY $ht TOPO'wto 
#n OfJtr JWm*co Dale pt r < ^ ^ c v j t > 3004 . {ncJu<fir>9 •>» *>*tof ***&**):* «i*f Douokwoffcrf> beiwwi 
jq*ft »tsu»y « A J ^ ^ n Soyer. and $P*™n * _pnm» i »s Stfor, 
nftAttiino ma Practtrtv bc»t»d a g o t D a y b w J t f 0 * ~ »agfc C i ty w friqgs . 7J» 
fofcWtrxg l##rtW Of* hemby inoorpontf** 3*pA<* «* » * JfcfPfc: 
1> £ o i l or co prorvid© & JUa^tali missing bard**re oa door* in hajtemat* 
* XXI * B * S t o o l * l a tfe* Kitchtoi 
* JU1 AtC*ch<va Xigkt £ixtrar*» 
* D ig Sex**!* TV i u tha K a d i * tQgoi 
* A i l ftWotrftnio E q u t p w ^ t fc C<»*pCtt*#tttii i*» tfc* K#&U Itoaa 
WJYW AND JfHJUiK AGK&E THAT TH* CC^TRACT 0£ADUN£* Kfc*>£A£NCtO tW 3W7WN Z* Of TftC REPC 
f CHfcCK A*»PUCA0't£ »OX); W JtfcMAJM UJtfCKAAKrSD f J ARC CHAtffcCD A« POtUOtftti 
T*fooo^rt^i*m*of$i*AD08WM 
4Mjf cquni#ti>rrr^  m**o wm* «ft4« sonttot AJI other <tm» of (he R£PC. tou^^g a* prior *WwKfr and (Wtftfolfers, 
notrnodlfttf toyttrf*AOO£ND^^ DO**W*<I I ttt»f 4ftmhaMnm« frtoo f JAMpOPM 
IfcuMaln T*w» on r»frr\»fc*Y gtor-r|.9P*rfl>ateL to acoepi tf* f«m» or tofc ADDENDUM in iccorcfcmcB *lfc fo* 
^ ^ t i Wfatt IKkAef gi^turS (Qift)""'' (Time) ^ p f s S y S ^ <TV*3^ 
, , AWgi»rANc«/cowteK)(pi^ibf^^ 
"f' J B€^cnrtdNj/t J ^ l ^ r j J B«y*r reacts me ^ flogo^g AOP^MOtiM, 
(SHX^w) paW) CHme)"^  p S n S i i ) ' <P«¥) fHirn*) 
iM SCAM WHOV^CVTH^UTAH IUTIO. gwiTicoN^iiwoN ^o weoiTjpof ^ y ^ ^ I S ^ ^ f T S P i S I ^ 
.*l»l» *»*» i # » « % U r i w i t w * w K / M l»«ir4M>«Mv ^ «-«ii*r frf Ui* iN r^k Oit)r M U M 4>t t * * l t « r tU 
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Jjj ADDENDUM NO. 2~- f^sl1 
REALTOR T O • ^"* * 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT *"" 
THIS IS AN I J ADDENDUM fx j COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an OfferReference Date pi <?:/Y/0'*f including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
Alo^fSa^ l?Gt&M/l &hl^„ as Buyer, and *Shzu£+>* jA r£S as Seller, 
regarding the Property located at a V Iff J>MLh^e<x fr^/~ A » - 7~ *>*+*& CJ+/ X-VblTFrThe 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: 7 
(Ziyi*. PtL^>j*s^ Ph.;c^ ^ Uil A*. ^ £g&, fro-o.—. ~~ 
H^ iJuj^t-fUveJ. -j£ 
(±) 1I-P &iK<Jej-u><LAA-h. rd t-e&xt / / P . /-IDA m\»Ltl*>s. h*L Ml 
K*,*d. -ft* J* ^ ^ * - M/)A vSggAfV-aAyk hofr>&~ -h> ^0 So. 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including ail prior addenda 
and counteroffers, the$e terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all pnor addenda and counteroffers, not 
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller (^Buyer shall have until ~5~(ax$ [ } AM \J$PW 
Mountain Time A g ^ f - a / i H / / X *Zec\'} to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
prQvi§ioiyt oXSecti9Q4J3 of the FfePC Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
fyer fXf Se&fer Signature ' 0a\6 ' Time I ] Bu [ M uff Date ( }Buyer( J Sailer Signature Oate Time 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE; 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: { ] Seller { ) Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM 
I J COUNTEROFFER: [ } Seller { ) Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. . 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (T\mQ) 
[ ] REJECTION! [ J Seller f J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH HEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17 ,mS. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
6/96 Rev 8/98 UAR Form 2 
US/ £Z/£.WK> UUJOi 1*AA 400 0*W 4/fO tf Aft l / D OAi\rU*U> 
Pagt- g^.of £*^ 
ADDENDUM NO. 3- . 
TO 
REAC ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
IS 
iripr 
— YATES as Seller, 
)J^£*j£jLh~£>.>r , / V * k d-itj VVeftT - The 
THIS IS AN C J ADDENDUM ^COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT {the "REPC") With 
an Offer Reference Date of £-fLj/cT including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
AI<L» I SuxA -R.&l&H~AfLti"> 'as Bwer. and _;>SJfttfStL * 
regarding the Property located at A •/ ? y J)&Jhi-e 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of th/REPC 
••C•/•«»-^  e , A y J - A k a / 2 )e^ / / / " n «. -S Ac// .4 fc_ ik fc<LlL. S i / ^ ^ 
TZ-j^tA^n -f* i 
-k 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC» including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers^not 
modified by this AODENOUM sheH remain m same. [ J Setter Qi Buyer shall have until ^ £Z£Q [ J AM pjfPft} 
Mountain Time / ^ e J b M A ^ W / X *7~e<f>*/ to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance wrth th^ 
PXSfid^on/of Section 23 of the'REPC.Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth In this ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
[ ]BuyerpqsefldrSignature Date Time [ JBuyerf J Seller Signature Date Time 
ACCEPTANCE/CCUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: { ] Seller [ J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM. 
I J COUNTEROFFER:! ] Seller! ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.^ 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) 
f ] REJECTION: C ! Setter f I Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Date) (Time) 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Dale) (Time) 
THIS FOfiM APPROVED BY THE UTAH KEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENEfcAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 1?,1$98, IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS f ORW. 
6/96 Rav. 8/93 UAB Form Z 
62/05/2884 23:34 14356431501 £> AIM/ t> •JAiUOAW 
FEB-05-3M ffil 52:41 Pit LOVE C(kJ<tCATIQNS FAX ^ 901 518
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ADDENDUM NOv 2 s . 
TO 
R6AL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
TWl£tSAN[ JAODEMDUMiXjCOUi ROfFERtot 
/££— 
[ F   that fiEAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "BE PC?)««. 
' ",«frtg «»orforadttemfe owl wunteroflsre between 
tcw»*ifi5> ifi.Wis €»/* f Miroby fw*ww»»ed a s pjut of the REKCJ / 
-_iA<J ^ Lut&tJJejigJ'...... , ^L 
To \ho detent (ho tw m* ot this ADDENDUM mwfity or canfltcl w'th any provisions ot Ifce RETC, inctiaSng att pffor acWoi ida 
JSSS&kj^ ^ t g ^ * 3 ^ of ihd PlEPC, UmoS^o accap&tf, tfw* ofter $5 sot forth to tl*ils ADD£N&'J& *h&fl fe{> a 
krSfctn^m 'Date r Tima { )Buyjw( J Seller Signature 
ACcepTANce/couwt^Hopp^R/ReaecTiow 
> ^ X ^OCEPlANCfis f 1 W ^ X S u ^ r h*fsi>y t e a m * Ui* mrm* 0/ IN& AO0£NDUM-
Dal© TUTICI 
ilmi^faf this tohiw of 0Btod^tfAppjP4QUW WO.^  
_ 'duo**.-'''*' K'W» 
<%nan»rc} ( 0 $ J $ ) (Time) ($kjn&tun») (Oat^) COfno) 
t H $ PO^M ^ W»fVOVC/> a y THC UTAH »OU. WTArit COMMf^KJI* A N 5 tW* O W e « OJ» TMC UtAM Arr©<W$Y OPNK*t41, 
CFPhDCt tV/fc A^Ctim* M,\im- Xt «a»LAC€$ AND tfUp^SSDGS AU. ^BVKHWtY A^POVSO Vt3WBIDN» OT THIS FOAM. 
Tab 2 
LINCOLN W. HOBBS, ESQ. (4848) 
JULIE LADLE, ESQ. (11223) 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven Yates 
466 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)519-2555 
Facsimile: (801)519-2999 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, SILVER SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN REIGHARD, an individual; SUZY 
REIGHARD, an individual; AIDAN 
REIGHARD, a minor, by and through his 
general guardian, SUZY REIGHARD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STEVEN YATES- an individual; and DOES 1 
through 10, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 070500061 
Judge Bruce Lubeck 
Pursuant to Utah R, Civ. P. 68. Defendant Steven Yates, through counsel, hereby offers 
judgment to be taken against him by Plaintiffs Alan Reighard. Suzy Reighard. and Aidan 
Reighard in the total amount of SI (\0O0.G0, which includes all costs, expenses, attorney fees, 
interest, and all other sums to which Plaintiffs and their counsel may be entitled. 
This offer shall remain effective for ten (10) days after service on counsel for Plaintiffs. 
502-Out OiTcrJuJgmt 
DATED this if day of -0?r^^ . 2007. 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
LINCOLN W. HOBBS 
JULIE LADLE 
Attorneys for Defendant Steven Yates 
SH2?MJ1 OilcrJudgmt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. / j 
I hereby certify that on t h e : y ^ day of ^Cl^^Mr" . 2007,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OFFER OF JUDGMENT to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated: 
\H Mail 
T4-Fax 
( ] Fed Ex 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Personally Served 
[ ) Email 
Daniel S. Drage 
BOYLE & DRAGE, P.C. 
2554 So. Monroe Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Facsimile 801-394-4923 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
|<LMail 
T/iFax 
i I Fed Ex 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ | Personally Served 
[ ] Email 
Christine E, Drage 
Trevor O. Resurreccion 
WEIL & DRAGE, APC 
23046 Avenida de la Carlota, Ste. 350 
Laguna Hills, CA 92653 
Facsimile 949-837-9300 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
--^y^ n* 4-^- \y~J*t&UA\~ 
5027 Oil OffcrJudgmt 3 
